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We use annual banking panel data from 2001 to 2006 to examine the 
effects of foreign ownership on Korean domestic banks’ performance in 
four areas of loan market behavior, management efficiency, transmission 
of advanced financial techniques, and profitability.  Several conclusions 
emerge.  First, increases in foreign bank ownership do not directly 
increase loans to large-sized firms.  Also, no significant evidence suggests 
that increased foreign ownership of domestic banks reduces loans to 
small- and medium-sized firms.  Consumer loans significantly increase 
with the level of foreign ownership.  Second, the increase in foreign 
ownership does not produce statistically significant cost saving, such as 
more layoffs and shutdowns of branches.  Third, we do not find any 
statistically significant relationship between non-interest income and 
foreign ownership.  We do find that higher foreign holding associates with 
higher foreign-related activities and lower derivative-related activities, 
suggesting that foreign investors prefer a more stable and safer bank 
management, particularly with foreign exchange control, rather than more 
aggressive management practices, such as derivatives.  Finally, we do not 
discover a statistically significant relationship between foreign ownership 
and profitability as measured by return on assets (ROA).  A statistically 
significant negative relationship does exist, however, between foreign 
ownership and return on equity (ROE). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades foreign banks significantly increased their 
ownership shares of emerging market bank systems.
1)
  The Asian financial 
Crisis in 1997 highlighted the importance of strong domestic financial 
systems in the overall economic development process.  While no general 
agreement exists on the role of foreign banks in achieving this goal, the 
market structure of the banking industry in many developing countries 
recently experienced dramatic changes.  The Korean bank system was no 
exception.  This trend reflects several factors, perhaps most notably the need 
for recapitalization of banking sectors in the wake of financial crisis, but also 
global market trends in financial market integration, privatization, 
liberalization, and mergers as well as acquisitions (M&As).  Increased 
foreign ownership in the Korean banking sector is particularly striking.  The 
financial structure of Korean banks underwent dramatic changes since the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  After the crisis, the flows of foreign capital played a 
significant role by injecting foreign financial resources into Korean 
companies to help alleviate severe liquidity problems.  These domestic 
changes could portend important implications for domestic financial 
intermediation.  
Few studies explore the effect of foreign ownership on the performance of 
domestic banks.  A number of recent studies focus on the efficiency effects 
associated with increased foreign ownership and resulting increase in 
competition for the domestic banking market.  For example, Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huzinga (2001) find that increased foreign ownership 
deteriorates domestic banks’ profitability by increasing the competition in the 
banking industry, while improving cost efficiency in domestic banks. 
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) discover that increased foreign 
                                                 
1) The growing presence of foreign-owned banks ranks as one of the most striking structural 
changes in financial sectors of emerging markets.  Foreign ownership in banking systems 
does increase significantly during the second half of the 1990s in Latin American and 
Central European countries.  Asian countries follow a similar path during the first half of the 
2000s. 
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ownership associates with lower profitability, but with improved efficiency 
of domestic banks in Latin American. 
Empirical analysis of the effects of broad foreign participation in the 
Korean banking industry proves quite limited.  Kim (2006) reports that 
increased foreign direct investment positively affects profitability, but does 
not affect bank management efficiency.  On the other hand, Lee (2006) 
determines that foreign banks’ entry significantly contributes to improved 
cost efficiency of Korean banks, but does not affect their profitability. 
 We explore these issues, using annual Korean bank panel data from 2001 
to 2006.  First, we describe the recent trends in foreign bank ownership in the 
Korea banking industry, summarizing the existing evidence on the causes 
and implications of foreign bank presence.  We entertain four hypotheses 
about the effects of foreign ownership on Korean domestic banks’ 
performance — loan market behavior, management efficiency, transmission 
of advanced financial techniques, and profitability.  
Foreign capital can enter the Korean banking industry in three different 
ways.  A foreigner bank can participate in Korean bank market either through 
foreign bank branches making corporate loans, through running both its retail 
and wholesale level bank business under its own brand name, or through 
directly acquiring stock ownership in the stock market.  We use the foreign 
holding share as a proxy variable of foreign ownership, which comes from 
KISVALUE provided by National Information & Credit Evaluation, Inc and 
annual report of each bank. 
Our findings include the following.  First, increases in foreign bank 
ownership do not directly relate to increases in loans to the large-sized firms 
or to decreases in loans to small- and medium-sized firms, but does associate 
with increases in consumer and housing loans.  Second, the increase in 
foreign ownership does not produce statistically significant cost saving, such 
as higher layoffs and shutdowns of branches.  Third, we do not find any 
statistically significant relationship between foreign ownership and non 
interest income.  We do find, however, that higher foreign ownership 
increases foreign-related activities and lower derivative-related activities, 
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suggesting that foreign investors prefer a more stable and safer bank 
management, particularly with foreign exchange control, rather than more 
aggressive management practices, such as derivatives.  Finally, increases in 
foreign ownership do not affect return on assets (ROA).  A statistically 
significant negative effect does exist between higher foreign ownership and 
return on equity (ROE).  This finding proves consistent with the results in 
other emerging countries, where increased foreign ownership deteriorates the 
domestic banks’ profitability due to the competitive pressure on the banking 
sector. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the institutional and 
structural changes of the foreign ownership that occurred in Korean banking 
industry before and after the Asian financial crisis.  Those changes include 
the opening of the Korean banking industry to foreign capital investment and 
the introduction of bank holding companies. Section 3 examines the effects 
of governance change from domestic to foreign ownership on bank 
performance.  In other words, attracting foreign investment may produce 
different investment outcomes and returns.  Section 4 tests the four 
hypotheses of foreign ownership on the bank management variables in the 
Korean banking industry, using annual panel data from 2001 to 2006.  
Section 5 provides a summary as well as policy implications. 
 
 
2. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF KOREAN BANKS 
 
This section briefly reviews the institutional and structural changes in the 
foreign banks’ entry in Korean bank market.  As in other emerging market, 
foreign participation (i.e., foreign banks) in Korea injected foreign currency 
loans into domestic firms during the 1970s and 1980s.  The Korean 
government gave foreign banks more favorable treatment in certain areas 
relative to domestic banks.
2)
  From the mid-1980s, the Korean government 
                                                 
2) The Korean government assigned Korean domestic banks the task of making relatively 
riskier loans to small- and medium-sized firms than foreign banks and to invest in less-
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began phasing out this preferential treatment of foreign banks.  The Korean 
financial authority significantly relaxed its control over the financial sector, 
launching five-year financial liberalization blue prints in 1993.  In 1994, 
regulators significantly lowered foreign entry barriers and abolished the 
economic needs test previously mandated for foreign bank investment.  In 
1995, regulators further eliminated the requirement to establish a 
representative office prior to opening other branches.  These deregulatory 
measures ushered in a rapid increase in foreign entry.  As a result, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the Korean financial sector through the opening of 
branches increased from $27.1 million in 1994, to $536.1 million in 1995, 
and to $447.2 million in 1996.  
The types of foreign entry into the Korean banking sector, however, 
experienced a tipping point, after the 1997 Asian (Korean) financial crisis.
3)
  
That is, the injection of foreign capital into the banking sector changed from 
opening branches to the investment of foreign capital into banks 
themselves.
4)
  The Foreign Investment Promotion Act of 1998 opened up the 
vast majority of corporations and financial institutions to foreign investors.  
By offering tax and other incentives, this Act created a more transparent and 
open business environment.  The second wave of the rapid increase of FDI in 
financial sector occurred in 1999.  FDI in the financial sector increased from 
$341 million in 1997, to $2,580 million in 1999, and to $1,925 million in 
2000.  
                                                                                                                   
profitable securities, such as monetary stabilization bonds.  
3) Although Korea experienced relatively high economic growth and low inflation in the early 
1990s, some weaknesses existed in the financial sector — low international reserves as well 
as poor government regulation and supervision of the banking system.  Regional and 
nationwide commercial banks overused short-term foreign lending as a source of funds.  The 
lack of transparency of balance sheets, income statements, and management practices all led 
to a crisis of confidence in Korean institutions. 
4) More specifically, opening branches provided the most important organizational form of 
foreign entry before the Asian financial crisis.  But, green-field investment and M&As 
largely replaced branch openings since 1999.  The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and 
Energy’s (MOCIE’s) foreign investment data for financial sector reports that around 75 
percent of foreign investment in the financial sector occurred as green-field investment and 
M&As, on average.  Due to the lack of disaggregated data on the mode of foreign entry to 
the banking sector, the MOCIE data include foreign direct investment in the financial and 
insurance industries. 
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The Korean government eased long standing legal restrictions on the 
foreign ownership of domestic banks, including 100 percent foreign 
ownership, as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis.  Two reasons 
explain this action.  First, the Korean government wanted to attract foreign 
capital into the Korean financial sector to facilitate restructuring of the 
financial sector.  Second, the government believed that the entry of foreign 
equity would strengthen the financial and domestic banking systems.  
Actually, foreign banks began to play a substantially greater role in the 
domestic banking sector in 1998 and 1999.  In early 1999, a group headed by 
Goldman Sachs invested $500 million to acquire a 17% stake in Kookmin 
Bank, Korea’s largest retail bank.  Commerzbank invested $167 million to 
acquire one-third ownership in the Korean Exchange Bank.  Moreover, New 
Bridge Capital invested $417 million in fall 1999 to acquire a major stake in 
the Korea First Bank.  These transactions generated a widespread expectation 
during and just after the Asian financial crisis that foreign investors would 
acquire a large part of the Korean banking sector, as government restructured 
and sold off recently nationalized banks.  These expectations did not 
materialize, however.  The proposed purchase of Seoul Bank by Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) collapsed in the second half of 
2000.
5)
  Moreover, the government abandoned its announced plan to sell its 
majority stakes in Chohung Bank and Hanvit Bank and its minority stakes in 
Korea First Bank and Korea Exchange Bank in December 2000 and instead 
injected additional public funds and moved several of the financial 
institutions into a financial holding company.  
The importance of foreign capital in the recovery and restructuring of the 
Korean banking system fell well below its initial expectation and 
substantially below that in parts of Latin America.  For example, foreign 
banks controlled 45% of all banking assets in Mexico by the end of 2000, just 
five years after the Mexican financial crisis.  Foreign financial institutions 
                                                 
5) The Korean Financial Supervisory Commission hired Deutsche Bank to restructure Seoul 
Bank.  Deutsche Bank may eventually acquire a significant stake in Seoul Bank, as a 
consequence. 
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Table 1 Financial Performance of Domestic Banks 
Variable 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 
BIS Capital Ratio 9.3 7.0 10.8 10.8 10.4 12.4 12.3 
Non-Performing Loans 
to Total Loans 
5.2  6.0  13.6  3.3  2.7  1.3  0.9  
ROA 0.3 –0.9 –1.3 0.8 0.1 1.2 1.1 
ROE 4.2  –14.2  –23.1  15.9  2.2  20.3  15.6 
Note: All entries in percentages. Data come from the Korean Financial Supervisory 
Commission. 
 
played an important role in providing capital and, thereby, boosting the 
economy.  But, similar to the experience of other Asian countries to the 
financial crisis, the Korean economy first plummeted and then recovered 
quickly, tracing out a V-shaped pattern.  Thus, foreign capital ultimately 
played a less important role in rehabilitating the Korean banking system and 
boosting the Korean economy than initially expected.  Instead, the Korean 
government incurred massive increases in domestic debt, associated with 
protecting depositors.  After injecting the second 40 trillion Korean won of 
public funds, restructuring of the banking sector drew to a close.  Table 1 
reports the financial performance of Korean domestic banks, which improved 
dramatically over time. 
Nonetheless, foreign entry into the financial sector through green-field 
investment and M&A’s after the Asian financial crisis did create a high 
degree of foreign ownership.  Foreign ownership in the Korean commercial 
banking sector increased from 33.5% in 1999 to 63.1% in 2006, on average.  
See table 2.  Of the seven major domestic banks — Kookmin Bank, Woori 
Bank, Hana Bank, Shinhan Bank, Korean Exchange Bank, Korean Citi Bank, 
Standard Chartered First Bank, only Woori Bank is not foreign owned at the 
end of 2006, where the foreign holding share exceeds 50%.  See table 3.  In 
addition, Korean commercial banks’ foreign ownership exceeds 50% 
except for the Woori and Jeonbuk banks.  This expansion facilitated the bank 
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Table 2 Foreign Capital Participation in the Korean Banking Sector 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Domestic Banks 33.5 35.9 37.8 44.4 47.7 57.7 63.0 63.1 
Nationwide 
Domestic Banks 
35.5 38.3 40.5 46.8 49.8 59.5 65.0 64.8 
Regional  
Domestic Banks 
3.2 1.9 4.1 11.2 23.3 39.0 40.6 41.3 
Note: All entries in percentages.  Data come from the Korean Financial Supervisory 
Commission. 
 
Table 3 Foreign Ownership of Stock (2006) 
Bank Kookmin Woori Hana Shinhan KEB SC First Citi 
Foreign 
Ownership 
82.70 9.52 80.21 58.90 77.06 100.00 100.00 
Bank Daegu Pusan Jeonbuk Jeju Gwangju Kyongnam  
Foreign 
Ownership 
65.72 56.10 28.11 
Shinhan 
BHC 
Woori 
BHC 
Woori 
BHC 
 
Note: All entries in percentages.  Ownership data come from KISVALUE provided by 
National Information & Credit Evaluation, Inc and annual report of each bank, as the 
measures of participation and control by foreign banks. 
 
restructuring undertaken in the wake of Asian (Korean) financial crisis by 
selling off a number of ailing domestic banks to domestic and foreign bidders.  
 
 
3. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND BANK MANAGEMENT 
 
3.1. The Effects of Foreign Banks’ Entry 
 
The reduced barriers and restrictions on foreign banks’ activities in Korea 
beginning in the early 1990s leveled the playing field between foreign and 
domestic banks.
 
Did increases in foreign bank operations affect the bank 
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management?
6)
  On the positive side, foreign banks provide an important 
channel for foreign capital inflows to finance a net expansion of domestic 
activities.  An increase in foreign participation through green-field 
investment and M&A’s establishes a better business environment.  Foreign 
bank participation in the banking industry can play a positive role in its 
developments by improving bank management efficiency, delivering 
advanced financial techniques.  Furthermore, foreign banks can increase 
competition in domestic markets and they can also promote improvements in 
government regulation and supervision of the financial system by importing 
business practices forged by more stringent home country regulations.  
On the negative side, foreign banks favor profitability rather than stability. 
The foreign banks can increase the volatility of domestic financial markets.  
The foreign capital channel provided by foreign banks not only encourages 
an inflow of capital in good times but also expedites a rapid outflow of 
foreign capital when a financial crisis occurs.  Also, rather than improving 
the regulatory or supervisory process, foreign banks can create complex 
problems for the domestic government.
7)
  Recent global financial crises 
reaffirm this negative side of foreign capital in the Korean financial market. 
As noted above, the Korean banking market accommodated foreign capital 
in three different ways.  First, foreign capital enters through the traditional 
route of foreign bank branches that deal with corporate loans, which 
characterized Korea in the second half of twentieth century.  Second, a bank, 
such as Citibank, for example, runs both its retail and wholesale level bank 
business in Korea, under its own US brand name.  Third, and quite 
differently, foreign buyers directly invest and acquire the stock of Korean 
domestic banks through the financial markets, achieving higher ownership in 
Korean banks.  Although those shares frequently do not come with voting 
                                                 
6) Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) note that foreign banks, operating in 
developing countries, generally achieve higher profitability than domestic banks; the 
opposite occurs in developed countries. 
7) When the Asian crisis hit, the supply of foreign lending evaporated quickly, confronting the 
domestic banks with a liquidity crisis.  Moreover, some commentators indict the initial 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue programs as worsening the liquidity crisis by 
requiring tighter credit (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002).  
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rights, they do allow the foreign buyers to monitor the Korean domestic 
banks efficiently and effectively.  
 
3.2. Empirical Studies of Foreign Ownership Effects 
 
Although few empirical studies examine the effect of the foreign 
ownership on the performance of domestic banks, we identify two lines of 
empirical analysis.  First, some researchers analyze systemic bank efficiency 
effects associated with foreign banks’ entry and the resulting increase in 
competition for domestic banks.  The general findings of these studies 
produce mixed results, depending on the nature of the market.  The foreign 
banks in developing markets prove more efficient in both profits and costs 
than domestic banks, whereas the opposite holds for developed markets (see 
footnote 6). 
Second, other researchers consider differences in lending patterns across 
domestic and foreign owned banks and, thereby, the stability of the financial 
system.  By studying bank-specific data on lending by domestic- and foreign-
owned banks in Argentina and Mexico, Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney (2000) 
report that foreign banks generally exhibit higher loan growth rates than their 
domestically-owned counterparts, with lower volatility of lending, 
contributing to lower overall volatility of credit.  Clarke, Cull, and Martinez-
Pería (2001) find that all enterprises, including small- and medium-sized 
firms, report facing lower financing obstacles in countries with higher levels 
of foreign bank involvement, by analyzing 35 developing and transition 
economies with data on the degree of foreign bank involvement across these 
countries. 
Since the Asian financial crisis caused significant changes in the market 
structure of the Korean banking industry, few studies consider the efficiency 
effects associated with increased foreign ownership and resulting increase in 
competition in the Korean domestic banking market.  The findings showed 
mixed results.  Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) and Martinez-Peria 
and Schmukler (2001) discover that increased foreign ownership associates 
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with lower Korean bank profitability, but with higher efficiency of domestic 
banks, Lee (2006) finds similar results on Korean bank efficiency, 
investigating the determinants of foreign banks’ entry into Korea and their 
effects on domestic banks’ management performance.  Lee considered 
whether foreign banks’ entry can affect the domestic banks’ performance, 
controlling for various factors determining bank performance.  Lee reported 
that foreign banks’ entry significantly contributes to the cost efficiency of 
Korean banks regardless of Asian financial crisis, but did not find any 
evidence that it also positively affects their profitability. 
Contrary to Lee (2006), Kim (2006) analyzes the effects of increased 
foreign direct investment on domestic bank performances from 1993 and 
2004.  Kim discovers that the higher foreign ownership causes a positive 
effect on profitability, but no significant effect on improving efficiencies of 
bank management, such as advanced financial techniques.  
The existing research in the Korean banking industry generates a complex 
picture, particularly on the effects of foreign banks’ entry on management 
efficiency and the stability of the banks.  Lee (2002) finds that foreign banks’ 
entry positively relates to the size of trade and foreign direct investment 
before the financial crisis, and positively associates with foreign countries’ 
ratios on financial interrelation after the crisis.  He also concludes that 
foreign banks’ entry did not affect Korean bank profitability, either ROA or 
ROE, but the increased competition reduced domestic banks costs.  He uses 
the ratio of the average level of loans by foreign branches to the average level 
of loans by domestic banks as a proxy variable of foreign participation.  
Kang and Kim (2005) use the ratio of average level of assets held by 
foreign banks to the average level of assets held by domestic banks as a 
proxy variable of foreign participation.  They conclude that increased foreign 
participation associates with increased operational costs and capital ratios, 
but with reduced loans to large-sized firms.  The increased foreign 
participation, however, does not show any statistically significant effect on 
bank profitability, asset soundness, or growth of domestic banks. 
Lee and Lee (2005) consider how the entry of foreign capital affects the 
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management of financial institutions, such as banks, securities companies, 
and insurance companies.  They document that higher foreign capital 
associates with higher profitability and more stability, decreasing corporate 
loans with higher risks.  Higher foreign ownership associates with more 
consumer loans to total loans and fewer corporate loans.  Foreign banks 
exhibit higher capital ratios and higher non-performing loan ratios than 
domestic banks.  This holds partly because foreign banks employ narrower 
interest margin than domestic banks.  Kang and Kim (2006) argue that the 
recent increase in acquisition of domestic banks by private equity funds 
associates with an increase in small- and medium-sized firms’ loans, capital 
ratios, and profitabilities.  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Econometric Specification  
 
Although Korean banks experienced a large inflow of foreign capital, its 
effects on the Korean banking system and on the Korean economy are not 
fully explored.  Using bank data from Bank Management Statistics and 
Korean macroeconomic data enable us to examine the empirical effects.
8)
  
We propose and test the following four hypotheses about foreign ownership 
in the Korean banking industry, using annual panel data from 2001 to 2006.  
 
Hypothesis 1: More foreign ownership of Korean banks lowers the ratio 
of loans to medium and small enterprises to total loans and increases loans 
to households more than loans to enterprises. 
 
Hypothesis 2: More foreign ownership of Korean banks improves business 
efficiencies by reducing human resources and the number of branches. 
                                                 
8) The related literature includes Lee (2006), Park and Lee (2006), Kang and Kim (2005), and 
Jeong and Lee (2006), and Choi and Lee (2006). 
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Hypothesis 3: More foreign ownership of Korean banks enables the 
introduction of advanced marketing strategies that generates a higher ratio 
of non-interest income to interest income (e.g., foreign exchange transactions 
and financial derivatives). 
 
Hypothesis 4: More foreign ownership of Korean banks increases the 
profitability of domestic banks.  
 
Typical measures of foreign penetration into the domestic banking 
industry include the following: the ratio of the sum of the total assets of those 
banks in which foreigners own more than either 40% or 50% of total equity 
to total bank assets or the ratios of the sum across all banks of the assets of 
each bank multiplied by the percentage of equity held by foreigners to total 
bank assets.  Our focus measures the foreign penetration of individual banks 
in the banking system.  Thus, we use the foreign holding share of equity as a 
proxy variable of foreign ownership.  See table 3.  We obtain the ownership 
data from KISVALUE provided by National Information & Credit 
Evaluation, Inc and annual report of each bank, as the measures of 
participation and control by foreign banks. 
We use the ―bank management statistics‖ of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission for bank management variables.  In this paper, in order to focus 
on the foreign ownership effects on the domestic bank management, we use 
information from thirteen nation-wide banks.
9)
  The econometric 
specification is as follows.  
 
,it it i it t it itY c FO Macro Control               (1) 
 
where i refers to the bank, t refers to the year, itY  equals one of the various 
bank management variables, itFO  is the foreign ownership share of total 
                                                 
9) The banks include Woori, SCFirst, Hana, KEB, Shinhan, Citi, Kookmin, Daegu, Pusan, 
Kwangju, Jeju, Jeonbuk, and Kyoungnam.  We exclude from our analysis five special banks. 
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outstanding stock, tMacro  refer to the macroeconomic control variables (i.e., 
GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, and total assets of the bank, and 
itControl  is a dummy variable that captures whether a bank exhibits 
complete foreign ownership (i.e., 100 percent value for foreign ownership). 
The bank management variables for the four hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  the ratio of household (consumer) loans to total loans and the 
ratio of small- and medium-sized-firms’ loans to total loans; Hypothesis 2:  
the number of employees, the number of executives, and the number of 
branches; Hypothesis 3: the ratio of net non-interest revenue to net interest 
revenue, foreign currency and derivative revenue to net interest revenue, 
foreign currency revenue to net interest revenue, derivative revenue to net 
interest revenue, and risk averse related revenue to net interest revenue; and 
Hypothesis 4:  return on assets and return on equity 
We determine the effect of foreign participation on the domestic banking 
sector as measured by the size and sign of .   We use the random effects 
model with several dummy variables where the fixed-effects models are not 
estimable.  In our model specification, the heterogeneous component of ic  is 
often unobserved or omitted.  When ic  and the error term are correlated 
(Cov( , ) 0),c    this random effects model in the panel structure is a suitable 
model specification.  
We assign the foreign dummy variable to 1 for the Korean Exchange Bank 
since 2003, when the Loanstar, a private equity fund, injected new capital 
into KEB.  We also assign the foreign dummy to 1 for Korea Citi-bank since 
2004, and 1 for SC First since 2005. 
 
4.2. Econometric Results 
 
Table 4 reports the findings for Hypotheses 1 and 2.  It suggests that the 
foreign ownership does not significantly affect loans to small- and medium-
sized enterprises, but does significantly and positively affect household loans.  
Since households likely repay loan providers, they represent secure loans.  
Thus, banks with a higher foreign ownership prefer a safer, more stable loan 
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Table 4 Test Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 
Small 
Business 
Loans 
to Total 
Loans 
Home Loans 
to Total 
Loans 
Number of  
Employees 
Number of  
Executives 
Number of 
Branches 
Constant 
0.308 
(2.66) 
0.461 
(3.01) 
4560.470 
(2.16) 
0.175 
(0.01) 
210.425 
(1.58) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
–0.033 
(–0.73) 
0.144 
(2.510 
644.568 
(0.84) 
–1.842 
(–0.27) 
–20.252 
(–0.44) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.081 
(3.669) 
0.011 
(0.38) 
174.069 
(0.42) 
0.738 
(0.19) 
1.079 
(0.04) 
GDP 
Per Capita 
–0.062 
(–1.33) 
–0.130 
(–2.18) 
–2760.527 
(–3.43) 
5.096 
(0.72) 
–88.967 
(–1.81) 
Total Assets 
–0.026 
(–0.95) 
0.097 
(2.95) 
6190.100 
(14.4) 
18.200 
(5.03) 
492.900 
(19.93) 
Foreign Bank 
Dummy 
–0.014 
(–0.58) 
0.053 
(1.68) 
–76.128 
(–0.18) 
2.495 
(0.64) 
–25.780 
(–0.94) 
Note: We transform the original data by multiplying ownership by 100, income by 1000, and 
total assets by 1,000,000.  While the main interest goes to the coefficients of foreign 
ownership variable on other policy-oriented dependent variables, the macroeconomic 
influence and bank size were controlled by including the unemployment rate, GDP per 
capita and total assets.  Other variables were included as robust checks, but the 
coefficients of the foreign ownership are stable and thus other results are omitted 
(available upon request).  The values in brackets are t-statistics. 
 
strategy, rather than more profitable, but higher risk, loans.
10)
  Also, although 
higher foreign ownership alters the management of Korean banks, this 
foreign ownership does not translate into significantly lower numbers of 
employees, executives, and branches.  Thus, we conclude that foreign 
ownership of Korea banks does not yet lead to significantly lower levels of 
labor and branches. 
                                                 
10) Higher foreign ownership does not imply significantly lower levels of loans to small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, since the negative coefficient of foreign ownership is not 
significant. 
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Table 5 Test Results for Hypothesis 3 
 
Net 
Noninterest 
Revenues  
to NIR 
Foreign 
Currency 
and 
Derivatives 
to NIR 
Foreign 
Currency 
to NIR 
Derivatives 
to NIR 
Risk 
Averse-
Related  
Net 
Revenues to 
NIR 
Constant 
0.440  
(2.06) 
1.202  
(1.45) 
2.627  
(1.57) 
–1.091  
(–0.94) 
–0.283  
(–1.09) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
–0.004  
(–0.05) 
0.828  
(3.79) 
1.212  
(3.59) 
–0.532  
(–2.43) 
0.084  
(1.71) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.025 
(0.59) 
–0.149  
(–0.87) 
–0.377  
(–1.07) 
0.176 
 (0.72) 
0.045  
(0.84) 
GDP 
Per Capita 
–0.268  
(–3.49) 
–0.385  
(–1.38) 
–0.797  
(–1.47) 
0.333  
(0.9) 
0.078  
(0.93) 
Total Assets 
0.076  
(2.12) 
–0.138  
(–1.33) 
–0.338  
(–2.22) 
0.203  
(2.07) 
–0.010 
(–0.47)  
Foreign Bank 
Dummy 
0.024  
(0.54) 
–0.127  
(–0.79) 
–0.480  
(–1.67) 
0.414  
(2.16) 
0.010  
(0.23) 
Note: See table 4, NIR equals net non-interest revenues.  The values in brackets are t-statistics. 
 
Table 5 reports the findings for Hypothesis 3.  It indicates that higher 
foreign ownership does not change the bank’s management patterns, such as 
interest-related versus non-interest-related activities, although we anticipated 
that higher foreign ownership would provide pressure to expand business into 
areas with higher rates of return.  We do find that the higher foreign 
ownership causes significantly higher foreign-related activities and 
significantly lowers derivative-related activities.  Thus, strong evidence 
exists that higher foreign ownership produces more stable and safer bank 
management, rather than more aggressive management practices such as 
significant use of derivatives.
11)
  We note that large banks, other things equal, 
                                                 
11) While banks can use derivatives to reduce risk, recent experience suggests that many banks 
actually increase their exposure to risk through the use of derivatives.  As an anonymous 
referee suggests, we will analyze the relation between dividend paying strategy and foreign 
ownership in a future extension of this paper. 
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Table 6 Test Results for Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 
ROA ROE 
Constant 
–1.274 
(–0.95) 
–50.984 
(–1.64) 
Foreign Ownership 
–0.243 
(–0.76) 
–13.541 
(–2.3) 
Unemployment Rate 
0.054 
(0.20) 
32.791 
(5.02) 
GDP Per Capita 
1.208 
(2.73) 
–23.762 
(–2.39) 
Total Assets 
0.125 
(0.84) 
0.269 
(0.10) 
Foreign Bank Dummy 
0.052 
(0.21) 
3.274 
(0.64) 
Note: We transform the original data by multiplying ownership by 100, income by 1000, and 
total assets by 1,000,000.  The values in brackets are t-statistics.  
 
pursue a more aggressive strategy with higher non-interest revenue to net 
interest revenue and higher derivative revenue to net interest revenue. 
In summary, the domestic banks in Korea did not experience much 
pressure from foreign owners to aggressively pursue riskier sources of 
revenue, but did see safer, rather than more aggressive, management 
strategies.  This environment provides higher protection to the investors, but 
it may not improve the efficiency of banks or the welfare of the Korean 
economy.  
Table 6 reports the findings for Hypothesis 4.  It shows that higher foreign 
ownership does not significantly affect profitability of the domestic banks, as 
measured by ROA, but significantly lowers ROE.  This result may capture 
reverse causality.  That is, foreign ownership increases in just the banks that 
experience operating difficulties during the Asian (Korean) financial crisis 
and became takeover targets only after the Korean government injected 
significant amount of capital into them. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A most striking structural change in the Korean banking industry is the 
remarkable increase in foreign ownership after the 1997 Asian (Korean) 
financial crisis.  The method of foreign participation changed from opening 
branches to facilitate a bank’s own country’s corporate financing to green-
field, M&A, and portfolio investment.  As the Korean government eased the 
long standing legal restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic banks, 
it served as a catalyst to enlarge foreign ownership.  The Korean government 
wanted to attract foreign capital into the Korean financial sector to facilitate 
restructuring in the financial sector right after the financial crisis.  The entry 
of foreign equity, however, was expected to strengthen the financial and 
domestic banking systems, since then.  As a result, the increase in foreign 
entry into the financial sector through green field investment and M&A after 
the Asian financial crisis created a high degree of foreign ownership and 
foreign management control of domestic banks.  Six out of seven major 
domestic banks are now foreign owned, where the foreigner ownership rate 
hovers around 80 percent. 
In this paper, we analyze the economic effects of foreign ownership on 
Korean banking performance.  We examine the effects of foreign ownership 
on banking industry in four areas — loan market behavior, transmission of 
advanced financial techniques, management efficiency, and profitability.  We 
use annual banking panel data from 2001 to 2006 to analyze these issues. 
First, increases in foreign bank ownership do not directly affect loans to 
small- and medium-sized-firms.  Household (consumer) loans do increase as 
the level of foreign ownership increases.  Second, the increase in foreign 
ownership does not significantly generate cost savings, such as layoffs and 
shutdowns of branches.  Third, higher foreign ownership does not 
significantly affect non-interest revenue.  We do find that higher foreign 
ownership does associate with higher foreign-related activities and lower 
derivative-related activities.  The foreign investors prefer a more-stable, safer 
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bank management, especially with foreign exchange activity, rather than a 
more-aggressive management practices such as derivative activity.  Finally, 
higher foreign ownership significantly decreases return on equity, but does 
not significantly affect return on assets. 
Higher foreign participation in the Korean banking sector induces some 
cost efficiency gains and service improvements for domestic banks, 
presumably by intensifying competitive pressures. This higher foreign 
participation, however, also evokes criticism about the public-good 
characteristics of the banking industry and the extension of loans to the 
corporate sector, especially reductions in lending to small- and medium-sized 
businesses. Our empirical results do not support this view.  Questions also 
emerge on whether foreign ownership of domestic banks may contribute to 
greater soundness of the Korean banking system.  In general, the optimal 
level of foreign ownership of domestic banks depends on the profitability of 
the bank industry.  Absent entry and exit barriers, then participation of 
foreign capital will continue to increase, as long as the Korean banking 
industry continues to exhibit sustainable growth. 
The Korean government plans to further expand and open the Korean 
financial markets and Korean financial institutions to promote the Korean 
financial industries as a new engine of the economy.  Recently, the Korean 
government executed several important deregulatory changes.
12)
  Whether 
foreign participation takes the form of wholly-owned branch banks or a 
direct ownership role in domestic banks, foreign financial firms provide 
substantial competitive pressure. 
 
 
                                                 
12) These changes included the additional abolition of requiring permission in capital 
transactions (January 2006), zero-based financial deregulation (the first step in November 
2005 and second step in February 2006), deregulation of the asset management businesses 
(June 2005), and the early execution of the plan for foreign exchange liberalization 
(moved up to 2009 from 2011). 
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